Approved For Release 2001/04/23 : CIA-RDP66R00638R000100100102-9

26 October 1962

SUBJECT: Aerial Transport of Nuclear Warheads into Cuba

1. At the present time there is no evidence that nuclear warheads are actually available in Cuba for use with the MRBMs or IRBMs, although there is considerable evidence that storage and/or assembly - check out is being prepared for such warheads. Since nuclear warheads would probably be the final item to be introduced into Cuba, it is quite likely that these warheads are the only missing critical item needed for the achievement of a Soviet operational MRBM capability. Therefore, it is over-riding priority to prevent Soviet shipment of these warheads into Cuba.

2. Studies have shown that it is feasible for the Soviets to transport about ten such warheads directly into Cuba from Soviet bases by TU-114s flying a great circle route, not overflying the territory of any other country, from such nuclear storage sites as Olenya. This method of import of nuclear warheads is probably the most attractive available to the Soviet Union in the present situation. It is possible, but not certain, that COMINT would give warning of such direct aircraft flights and possibly even indications of a nuclear association therewith. However, the present blockade would have no capability for preventing such transport. Once the aircraft has landed in Cuba, the warheads could be rapidly dispersed and protected, and be available almost instantaneously for mating with the missiles. Therefore, it is essential that some plan of rapid action be available to prevent such flights.

3. It is therefore proposed that the following actions be taken:

a. An aerial blockade of Cuba be established to prevent import of offensive weapons.

b. All aircraft wishing to proceed to Cuba must land at a U.S.-controlled base and be subject to inspection to insure that no nuclear materials or other components of offensive weapons are aboard.

c. All aircraft refusing to obey this blockade will be challenged, directed to a U.S. base, and, if necessary to insure compliance, shot down.

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